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Essay by Raisha Kasaju  
“Living in the Dark in Nepal”  
 
I proposed my economics senior thesis on electricity shortage in Nepal which was entitled ‘Living in the 
Dark in Nepal’. Since the research was on a foreign third world country that lacked many published 
work, I had great difficulty finding any articles and data on it at the beginning. However, my queries 
were resolved by Luke Vilelle, a librarian at the Hollins Wyndham Robertson Library. It was him who 
helped me initiate my thesis research. 
 At the beginning of the research, I was debating whether to continue on the same topic as I had 
not found any research methods other than a few databases and sources that had limited information 
on Nepal which were minimally related to my research topic. After Luke walked me through research 
means such as various databases and several other options under course guides, I was able to pool 
together a good amount of information which was encouraging and at the same time involved me more 
on the topic. Thus, I decided to make it my final topic.  
 I used all the research sources highlighted by the Hollins library on its website. Apart from the 
library’s online resources, I also received multiple opportunities to gain knowledge through examples of 
previous senior theses that the library had in reserve. Along with my thesis advisor, those theses copies 
also gave me ideas on how to frame thesis statements and organize ideas.     
 Nepal’s electricity situation remains to be a problem since many years, but it has not been well 
addressed. So, it was a challenging task to be able to find reliable sources. On rare occasions when I 
could not find articles at the Hollins library, the Interlibrary Loan (ILL) system offered by the library 
proved to be imperative for the success of my thesis work. This allowed me access to a broader range of 
information from libraries at other universities and institutions. ILL proved to be a useful means to find 
journal articles, which were relevant and reliable sources for my thesis.  
 While working on my senior research, I learned that all the sources may not be reliable to be 
used in our work. Therefore, it is important to be judicious and also consult librarians as they have a 
wider range of ideas regarding research sources. From my experience, I realized that with proper 
guidance to make use of the library resources, one can find sufficient information to tackle any kind of 
research topic.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 This thesis will look at the problem of electricity shortages in Nepal. We will consider the 
time frame from 1992 until present because the country initiated policies aimed at energy 
sector privatization starting from that year. Until 1992, Nepal’s electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution depended solely on Nepal Electricity Authority (henceforth NEA), 
a government owned and controlled grid. Since hydropower is the major source of the 
country’s energy mix, Private Sector Participation (henceforth, PSP) in the electricity sector will 
refer to private investment in the production of hydropower in Nepal. The introduction of PSP 
in the hydropower industry has given rise to varying scales of private hydropower projects. 
However, NEA still holds a vertical monopoly because it continues to be a vertically integrated 
electricity grid, where there are multiple electricity generators, including PSP, but a single 
supplier of electricity – the NEA. The private sector participants, also known as the Independent 
Hydropower Producers (henceforth, IPP)i, are required to sign Power Purchase Agreements 
(henceforth, PPA) with the NEA in order to sell their electricity. There is an exception for the 
cases of hydropower plants with installed capacity up to 1,000 KW in rural areas where the 
national grid’s transmission lines are not accessible. According to the International Energy 
Agency (henceforth, IEA), as of 2009, only 43.6% of the total households had access to 
electricity.ii This thesis hypothesizes that increased PSP in the electricity sector will help Nepal 
increase its electricity supply. It is to be made clear that increased electricity privatization 
means adding private resources to the already existing national grid’s power supply, rather 
than replacing it.  
8 
 
The NEA’s 2009 annual report revealed a significant annual increase in the country’s 
overall energy demand: from 3,490 GWH in 2008 to 3,859 GWH in 2009. Out of 2009’s total 
electricity demand, only 3,130.77 GWh were met and the remaining 728.23 GWh had to be 
declared as the load shedding hours – electricity shut down due to demand exceeding supply, in 
order to save the entire electricity distribution system from failing. It is important to note that 
88.32% of Nepal’s electricity demand in 2009 was satisfied through hydropower: 58.76% 
contributed by the NEA hydro, 29.56% by the purchase from Nepal’s IPPs, 0.29% by the NEA 
thermal, and the remaining 11.38% by energy imported from India.iii  
 Since the electricity demand has been exceeding the supply in Nepal, we will look at 
how NEA’s hydropower projects have performed so far in an effort to meet the demand. After 
this, our attention will shift toward the need to attract domestic as well as foreign private 
investment into the country’s electricity generation, management and distribution. We will 
briefly consider various approaches to electricity privatization. Since the majority of the 
Nepalese population resides in rural areas, which lack even greater access to  electricity 
compared to urban areas, a good deal of the discussion and subsequent empirical analysis will 
center on the possibilities of private investment towards Rural Electrification (henceforth, RE).
 The empirical chapter in this thesis includes a series of case studies on Nepal’s two of 
the private hydropower projects - a micro-hydropower focusing on rural electrification and a 
medium-scale hydropower project. For the micro-hydropower project, we will compare results 
from its Cost-Benefit Analysis (henceforth, CBA), to the profitability results provided by the 
article mentioned in chapter 3.2. The medium-scale project will show indirect benefits of 
private hydropower projects, and the last article in the empirical chapter will show the strength 
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of private ownership on affecting efficiency and profit levels. We will suggest a level of 
government intervention that may still be required to encourage more PSP in the country’s 
hydropower industry. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: HYDROPOWER AND THE CASE FOR PRIVATIZATION 
2.1 Hydropower as the Most Suitable Source to Fulfill Nepal’s Electricity Needs 
 Hydropower is a renewable source of energy. It is derived from the stored energy in 
water that flows from a higher to a lower elevation due to the earth’s gravitational force. There 
are three main types of hydropower systems. One of them is impoundment which requires the 
use of dams. The other is the run-of-river system which extracts a portion of the total energy 
contained in the flow of water; this does not require dams. The last one is a pumped storage 
system, which during periods of low electricity demand, pumps water from a source to a 
storage reservoir located at a higher elevation. During periods of peak electricity demand, 
water is released from the reservoir, thus producing electricity as the stored water converts 
into hydraulic or kinetic energy. All three systems follow a common process. The water flowing 
from a higher elevation turns the blades of turbines placed at a lower elevation. These turbines 
then rotate electric generators, from which the generated electricity is passed on to 
transmission lines. Finally the systems produce usable electricity.iv  
  Since hydropower in Nepal, due to its feasibility, is mostly used to produce electricity, 
we will use hydropower and hydroelectricity interchangeably. Out of Nepal’s total hydropower 
potential of 83,000 MW, it has been found that 43,000MW is technically and economically 
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viable.v However, during the fiscal year 2008/09, for the first time in a century long history of 
electricity generation and consumption, the Nepalese government declared a “National 
Electricity Crisis” in Nepal.vi In conclusion, we will sum up the reasons as to why the nation is 
facing this crisis despite the fact that energy sector privatization efforts have been in place since 
1992.  
 Hydropower is the most feasible way for Nepal to increase its electricity generation 
since it lacks other significant sources of conventional energy such as nuclear energy and fossil 
fuels. As of 2,000, the annual cost of importing fossil fuels averaged to about 25% of the 
country’s export earnings.vii Thus, it does not make sense to spend so much for electricity 
purposes when Nepal already has a noteworthy hydropower potential. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that more than 80% of Nepal’s terrain is hilly, and more than 6,000 small rivers and 
rivulets are flowing southwards, thus giving more occasions to run of river hydropower 
projects.viii Other reasons behind the choice of hydropower to develop the country’s energy 
sector are discussed below.  
 Empirical findings have found that per capita energy consumption, particularly 
electricity, is the stimulating input for enhancing economic growth.ix We would expect that 
while higher energy consumption may result in higher economic growth, this growth, in turn, 
may lead to further increases in the rate of energy consumption to keep up with the increased 
economic growth. Thus, if Nepal wants its economy to grow steadily, then it should give priority 
to a reliable source of energy – hydropower. It has been suggested that even under a high 
economic growth rate scenario of about 12% per annum, peak power demand will reach only 
3,400 MW and energy requirement of 16,000 GWh by 2020.x These estimates suggest that 
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Nepal’s revealed hydropower potential is more than enough to keep up with the growing 
economy. Here, we claim that it is possible to reach this potential with additional PSP in the 
country’s power sector.   
 
 
2.2 The Need of PSP in Nepal’s Electricity Market 
 Based on the conjectures and claims raised under the previous subsection 2.1, 
hydropower plants can help Nepal increase its electricity supply, but how efficiently this can be 
done is still a major concern. Using the results from Data Envelopment Analysis (henceforth, 
DEA), we will assess the performance of hydropower plants owned and controlled by the NEA. 
DEA is an efficiency modeling approach that analyzes input-to-output ratios for decision making 
units, in this case – hydropower plants.xi Here, we use the input-oriented DEA that focuses on 
reducing inputs by maintaining a constant level of output. Since this method focuses on the 
management of inputs, it only shows efficiency on the electricity generation sector. This 
particular DEA has revealed efficiency levels for fourteen NEA-owned and operated 
hydropower projects over the period 2001-2004.  
 The results show that the average technical efficiency of hydropower plants of NEA 
remains around 74%. Technical efficiency in this model refers to the relationship between the 
physical quantities of resources used to produce a physical unit of output. This result suggests 
that those hydropower plants could reduce their inputs, such as the number of employees, and 
thus minimize the costs of Operation and Management (henceforth, O&M) by 26% without 
reducing their outputs. NEA, which is a decentralized unit owned and controlled by the 
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Nepalese government, works under the supervision of the Ministry of Water Resources 
(henceforth, MOWR). Due to the partial decisions of the country’s politicians and top-level 
government authorities, NEA remains one of the most poorly managed and overstaffed electric 
public utilities in the world.xii Over-staffing should not be a problem with private firms’ cases 
because those profit-oriented investors try to minimize their costs as much as possible, 
including, but not limited to unnecessary labor costs. The technical efficiency could also be 
improved through increased Research and Development (henceforth, R&D) on production 
plants and methods. Also, providing necessary on-the-job training to the labor force hired may 
help improve labor productivity, which, in turn, would increase efficiency. However, the NEA is 
not able to consider those options because it lacks financial resources.xiii  
Those hydropower projects’ average scale efficiency is 71%, where a scale-efficient 
hydropower plant is defined as the plant whose marginal output production is proportionate to 
its marginal input. This 29% of average scale inefficiency could either be due to decreasing 
returns to scale because of continued production even after the plants’ maximum capacity, or 
because the production scale size has not reaped full benefits associated with potential 
increasing returns to scale. Either way, more efficient production methods would help increase 
those plants’ scale efficiencies. This requires improving factor productivity which is possible 
through on-the-job training, and plants-upgrades with the help of technological advancements. 
However, both options require more funding, which NEA lacks.  
Here, an argument could be made as to why we are emphasizing on private investment 
rather than any other kinds of financial assistances from foreign countries or multilateral 
organizations. First of all, governments of those countries where electricity is still publicly 
13 
 
provided are willing to offer financial assistance expecting a portion of the electricity in return 
in order to increase the public provision to their own citizens. Other than through transmission 
lines, there haven’t been any other scientific innovations regarding ways on how to store and 
export energy. Hence, Nepal’s energy export is limited to its two huge neighboring economies – 
China and India. However, both of those countries that are facing rise in energy demand have 
deregulated their energy sectors. Thus, government assistance is not much of an expectation 
from these countries. Receiving funding from non-neighboring countries is quite unlikely 
because Nepal would need to use transmission lines to export its electricity. However, 
extending electricity transmission lines to other foreign non-neighboring countries does not 
sound economically and technically practical for Nepal. Had this been possible, then the NEA 
could have easily extended its transmission lines to Nepal’s rural areas and improve rural 
electrification. Moreover, foreign countries’ financial contracts to help increase Nepal’s 
electricity supply tend to focus on large scale hydropower projects on international levels. 
While considering funding options, attention needs to be given to Nepal’s rural electrification. 
According to the NEA’s 2009 annual report, the highest percentage of electricity demand comes 
from the domestic sectorxiv, and according to the World Development Indicators (henceforth, 
WDI), as of 2009, 82.28% of Nepal’s total domestic households reside in rural areas.xv Thus, 
incentives should be provided to private investors who consider smaller hydropower projects as 
well.  
Another case “for” increased electricity privatization needs the assumption that more 
PSP will create a competitive electricity market. This assumption is supported by the National 
Water Plan, 2005 (henceforth, NWP) which states that Nepal’s electricity sector will operate in 
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a truly competitive environment with PSP.xvi Conventional economic theory suggests that 
increased competition in any market leads to increased efficiency in order to survive the 
competition. This will increase electricity supply. However, for competition to prevail, the 
government needs to strictly limit the concentration ratio of private firms participating in the 
energy sector.  
Loans and grants from multilateral organizations usually have high interest rates and 
other strings attached to them - as we will see in the subsection 4.1. Thus the rise in this debt 
will not help the already underfunded NEA. Moreover, even those organizations have funding 
limitations that does not allow them to finance only a single sector heavily.xvii This is especially 
true for a small country like Nepal, where a variety of sectors even at present are 
underdeveloped.  
The main reason for the need of more PSP is to release the NEA from any financial 
liabilities that arise from accepting loans and strings attached to grants from multilateral 
organizations and other foreign countries. Financial assistances from multilateral organizations 
and foreign countries may outweigh both domestic and foreign PSP. However, the bottom line 
here is to help lower the financial burden that the NEA has to handle alone if left without the 
liberalization of its electricity market. Increased domestic and foreign PSP in hydropower adds 
electricity supply to the national grid, rather than leaving the responsibility to the already 
inefficient and underfunded NEA alone. 
 According to the above DEA analysis concerning NEA operations, the hydropower 
projects’ overall efficiency stands roughly at 50%. This figure shows that NEA’s plants are half 
way away from full efficiency. Although PSP in hydropower began only from 1992, the fact that 
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29.56% of NEA’s current total electricity supply is contributed by the IPPs reflects strong 
evidence for the hypothesis of this thesis; that is, that increased PSP in the electricity sector 
would help Nepal increase its electricity supply.  
  
 
2.3 Overview of Legal Efforts to Promote Electricity Privatization in Nepal 
 The Nepalese government’s efforts to include private investors in hydroelectricity 
production started in 1992. The Hydropower Development Policy 1992 stated that private 
investors who transmit electricity to the NEA from their own substations are exempted from 
income tax for ten years. xviii Those entrepreneurs can use NEA’s electricity transmission lines to 
do so. Those provisions reduce the construction cost of transmission lines required to sell the 
generated electricity to the NEA, and consecutive reductions in income taxes relatively increase 
their profits. This act along with the Electricity Act of 1992 introduced the Hydroelectricity 
Development Unit under the Ministry of Water Resources.xix This unit’s responsibilities include 
promoting PSP in the hydroelectric projects and approving projects with a capacity of 
1000+KW, along with providing necessary support to those private investors in the operation 
and maintenance of their projects.xx The unit in general encourages and follows up with PSP in 
the electricity market.  
 Although other policies talked about the development of private investment in 
hydropower, the Hydropower Development Act of 1992 explicitly stated that one of its 
objectives was to motivate the national and foreign private sector investments for the 
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development of hydroelectric power.xxi The above policies were intended to attract PSP in order 
to increase the electricity supply in Nepal. 
 Apart from the policies mentioned above, the Department of Electricity Development 
(DOED) was established under the Ministry of Water Resources (henceforth, MOWR) in 1993 to 
attract private sector investment to improve the electricity sector of Nepal. The DOED has been 
given responsibilities to issue survey and generation licenses, to provide concessions and 
incentives, to facilitate imports of the plants, equipment and goods required for projects, to 
facilitate in acquiring government land required for the project, and to help in obtaining various 
permits and approvals. Hydroelectricity projects that have an installed capacity greater than 
1,000 KW are required to obtain a license as a permission to start and operate their work. Such 
licenses are valid for up to five years for survey purposes, and up to fifty years for electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution purposes.xxii No private energy project is allowed to 
be nationalized as long as their licenses are valid.xxiii This is a right of the IPPs that secures their 
investments.  However, such rights are not free of cost; the licensees, after they start 
generating electricity, are required to pay royalties to the government in Nepal (table A.I and 
A.II).  
 NEA’s encouragement of PSP in the energy sector can clearly be noticed from the above 
mentioned policies and acts. Along with opening energy privatization opportunities, NEA has 
made some changes that contradict its motivation to privatize. The NEA used to exempt private 
investment from tax for the first fifteen years, along with being protected from nationalization 
during its license period.  The taxation policy is no more applicable. This change in its policy 
might negatively affect private sector involvement.  
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 The IPPs can sell their electricity through a Power Purchase Agreement (henceforth, 
PPA) with the NEA. So, for both domestic sales as well as for foreign exports, NEA is the 
ultimate authority through which electricity sales take place. The government has made 
provisions with India for power exports by the IPPs. As of 2007, the electricity sales summed up 
to 50 MW, and the agreements have been made to extend the export possibilities for IPPs up to 
150 MW. 132 KV transmission line are available and 220 KV transmission line has been recently 
identified.xxiv Thus, the private entrepreneurs will not be limited to earning only domestic sales 
revenue, which is another form of incentive to attract more IPPs.  
 Policies to encourage PSP in Nepal’s rural areas provide comparatively more favorable 
investment options to the interested private entrepreneurs. Considering the demand structure 
and infrastructural conditions of rural areas in Nepal, Micro-Hydropower Projects (henceforth, 
MHP) – the ones that have installed capacity of up to 100KW and Small-Hydropower Projects 
(henceforth, SHP) – the ones with installed capacity of 101KW – 1MW are suitable for RE. 
Hydropower projects up to 1 MW do not require licenses and do not have to pay any income 
taxes on the revenue generated from electricity sales.xxv The Hydropower Development Policy 
of 2001 stated that IPPs dealing with hydropower plants with an installed capacity of up to 1 
MW that are not linked to the NEA are allowed to set their own electricity tariff rates 
(electricity prices) to sell and distribute the electricity.xxvi This policy also stated that MHPs 
would be considered for prioritized loan provision and any other required assistance.xxvii For the 
sake of developing electricity in rural areas, the government allows private investments for RE 
to enjoy monopoly power. Licenses are not issued to more than one private entrepreneur or 
company for electricity distribution in the same area as long as the existing private investor(s) 
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are able to fulfill electricity demand for that region.xxviii Unlike the comparatively larger IPPs, 
private investors of RE are exempted from having to pay energy royalty.xxix   
 
   
2.4 Different Approaches to Electricity Privatization in Nepal 
 Once again, it is to be noted that increased PSP in Nepal’s energy sector does not mean 
eliminating the public provisions that already exist. This is about increasing electricity supply, 
and not about replacing the national grid by private investments. Among different types of 
privatizations, one way is to lease out the government-owned and controlled electricity 
substations to the interested private investors and operators. Those private entrepreneurs buy 
the high voltage power and sell the electricity from there. The NEA personnel have little or no 
incentive to manage the electricity substations and the equipment used for generating 
electricity properly, as is the case with other publicly provided goods, because neither they own 
those plant assets nor do they get any portion of the revenue earned from the electricity 
supplies except for their share of salaries. This leaves little hope for future prospects of Nepal’s 
electricity sector since the country heavily depends on the vertical monopoly – the NEA. Those 
employees also lack the incentive to solve the electricity pilferage problems that NEA faces. 
Electricity is stolen by illegally tapping from the transmission lines. This theft takes place at the 
distribution phase. It is not difficult to track the pilferage. However, NEA staff is not necessarily 
well-motivated to take actions against such theft. Private managements do not lack such 
motivations because, other than paying NEA for the electricity drawn at the substations, they 
are the ones to collect the rest of the revenue from the electricity supply allowed by the 
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maximum capacity of those substations. So, they would be motivated to invest in ways to avoid 
pilferages along with investing in various scales of R&D to increase operations efficiency. 
Therefore, leasing out the substations to private investors improves the substations 
management along with the reduction in electricity pilferages. These improvements, overall, 
could increase the hydroelectricity generated and distributed throughout the country. This 
leasing technique was promoted by the Hydropower Development Policy of 1992; which stated 
that the private sectors willing to operate the hydroelectric plants, transmission and 
distribution lines, leased out by the government, are exempted from income tax for five years. 
xxx  
 More than just leasing out substations, increasing the number of new private electricity 
substations would help increase power supply in the long run. Managing one’s own substation 
on a relatively longer basis is more effective than the one that has been temporarily leased 
from the government. Although leasing out the substations supposedly tend to increase 
management efficiency, the process through which the private investors purchase power from 
the NEA and sell it to other individuals and businesses seems to be focusing more on electricity 
marketing. Whereas, this might increase the sale of electricity and solve the management 
problem temporarily during the leasing periods, the bigger problem is the lack of electricity 
supply. So, in an effort to boost power supply, rather than just subcontracting PSP to manage 
the already existing government-owned and operated substations, another option is to attract 
more IPPs in the electricity generation sector itself. This decentralization could take place in any 
of the three major phases: generation, transmission and distribution. As of 2006, Nepal’s entire 
energy sector’s generation sector comprised of 21.75% of PSP, whereas the transmission and 
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distribution sectors comprise of 0% of PSP.xxxi According to the latest NEA annual report, PSP in 
electricity generation has increased to 29.56%, whereas the transmission and distribution 
remains to be under NEA’s control. Opening up the electricity generation sector to private 
investors, both domestic and foreign, may increase the total electricity supply by way of: i) 
capacity benefit – capacity (KW) of the hydropower project that can be produced at any time 
on demand, and ii) energy benefit- the energy (KWh) generated by the hydropower project at a 
given period of time.xxxii This privatization scheme can be operated through a ‘Build, Own, 
Operate and Transfer’ (henceforth, BOOT) system. In this case, the private businesses invest 
their time and funds to commence and maintain their electricity substations in order to earn 
profit by selling electricity to the NEA. Since PSP has not been introduced to the country’s 
transmission and distribution sectors yet, the national grid is responsible to construct grid 
connections nearest to the private power stations. Once the NEA pays for the energy received 
at such stations, it is solely responsible for the rest of the expenses including but not limited to 
transmission and distribution losses. Under the BOOT technique, the IPPs, according to the 
legally bound PPA, are required to supply a certain fixed amount of energy annually to the 
NEA.xxxiii  
 Along with privatization, concentration ratios of the private investors should be strictly 
monitored by the government. Each investor would want to earn comparatively more profit in 
order to survive and excel the market competition. This goal motivates the private players in 
the market to invest more in R&D in order to improve production techniques. This increased 
efficiency in the production and supply could lead to further increases in the electricity supply 
along with reduction in electricity prices. This electricity tariff reduction provides affordable 
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electricity to the poor population of Nepal where, according to the WDI, the per capita GNI is 
only $440 as of 2009. Moreover, those profit-seeking private businesses would be able to 
reinvest their retained profits, leading to further investment and progress of the hydropower 
industry. For this to happen, the NEA must be willing to give up its vertical monopoly that it still 
holds, and open up the energy distribution sector as well to PSP. Once again, concentration 
ratios of participating firms should be limited in order to prevent any electricity price hikes.   
 Although increased PSP may benefit Nepal’s energy sector and electricity consumers 
through increased production and management efficiency and electricity supply, respectively, it 
may not be beneficial to the private investors themselves. Hydropower projects have high start-
up costs. Since a majority of Nepal’s labor is unskilled, regular and proper technical and 
management training will add immensely to the cost. There is also a high opportunity cost 
involved for the IPPs because PSP in the hydropower sector have recently begun. The first 
private hydropower project ever in Nepal was delivered in the year 2000.xxxiv There are a total 
number of nineteen differing private hydropower projects that are currently connected to the 
national grid.xxxv Based on this small number of hydropower projects, it would be risky for the 
IPPs to extrapolate conclusions about their investments. 
 In addition to hydropower, Nepal’s other economic sectors aren’t very developed 
either. Thus, this poses higher opportunity costs to the nation itself by shifting private capital 
investment from other economic sectors towards hydropower.  
 For the above reasons and suppositions, it sounds reasonable to expect certain level of 
government interference to implement policies favorable to the PSP, and geared to reduce 
market failures due to imperfect competition and potential hikes in electricity prices. 
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Government assistances could be extended to the IPPs through grants and subsidies. 
Alternatively, the Nepalese government could negotiate with multilateral agencies such as the 
Asian Development Bank (henceforth, ADB) and the World Bank (henceforth, WB) to provide 
loans to the IPPs at lower interest rates or by constructing more transmission lines in order to 
facilitate electricity transfer from the private substations to the NEA. 
  
 
2.5 The Need of PSP in Rural Areas of Nepal 
 According to the latest World Bank Development Indicators, as of 2009, 82.28% of the 
total Nepalese population resides in rural areas with limited access to energy.xxxvi The IEA report 
2008 reveals that 89.7% of the urban households had electricity access, whereas only 34% of 
the rural households were electrified.xxxvii Due to a consistent lack of electricity, rural population 
in Nepal rely on burning wood, agricultural residues, animal dung, and kerosene to meet their 
cooking, heating and lighting needs. The aforementioned sources contribute to air pollution 
and deteriorate individuals’ life expectancies. It has been found that a hydropower project with 
a 100KW capacity can replace 100,000 liters of kerosene annually if the electricity is used only 
for lighting.xxxviii So, more investment in hydroelectric projects would partly contribute to a 
cleaner environment and would help improve people’s health. Moreover, using a renewable 
source, such as water, allows non-renewable resources to be allocated to economic activities 
that do not have close substitutes except for those non-renewable resources. However, the 
main reason for the urgent need of RE is that majority of the villages in Nepal even at present 
completely lack electricity as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter.  
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 Since the NEA, due to financial constraints, has given up on rural electrificationxxxix, PSP 
is a necessity rather than an option in Nepal’s rural areas. Thus, it is significantly important to 
encourage PSP in those areas. However, this is not an easy task. The profit-oriented IPPs who 
can afford a proper sum of investment find RE less attractive because they are interested in 
larger projects that can earn them higher profits. However, MHPs and SHPs rather than larger 
projects are suitable for rural areas because those rural villages lack infrastructures required to 
transmit electricity to the national grid. Most of them would have to remain as isolated grids 
until the investors want to spend more money on building up the necessary infrastructures. 
Even if the IPPs invest into improving the infrastructure including construction of transmission 
lines in order to make their electricity available to a larger group of consumers, the other 
hindrance for larger projects is the dispersed population in those rural villages that limits the 
demand for electricity consumption. This would constrain large hydropower plants from 
reaching their actual potential, creating inefficiency. These factors lead to lesser electricity sales 
revenue and higher fixed costs. And even if the demand is plenty, then the price has to remain 
within certain range because a majority of the villagers cannot afford electricity. This would 
negatively affect their profit margins. Thus, the private entrepreneurs who can easily afford 
small scale hydropower investment are interested in larger projects situated closer to 
metropolitan areas near the national grid, from where they could use the NEA’s transmission 
lines to sell electricity to the national grid.   
 So, the ones who are interested in RE tend to be the middle-class entrepreneurs who 
can afford investment costs for relatively small-scale projects such as MHPs and SHPs. These 
entrepreneurs are expected to invest not just on hydropower plants construction, but also on 
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the construction of transmission lines in order to supply the electricity to the village residents. 
They can hardly afford to build up a hydropower plant and run it, least yet building up 
transmission lines. Furthermore, the project sizes may not be reasonable to spend huge sum of 
money on constructing transmission lines. This just makes RE less appealing to private 
investors. Thus, although the government has been making special provisions from MHPs and 
SHPs as mentioned under the subsection 2.3, it could make RE more attractive by financing the 
transmission lines for isolated grids even just in the rural villages and other close areas so that 
the IPPs have possibilities of earning more electricity sales revenue. Lessons could be learned 
from a case study concerning Guatemala (as discussed in the subsection 3.3), where the 
government allocates a certain portion of its privatization revenue towards subsidies or other 
facilities to IPPs interested in rural electrification. The Nepalese government, as mentioned 
earlier, could also provide grants and subsidies, along with negotiating with various multilateral 
agencies to provide loans with low interest rates to the IPPs interested in RE.  
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Measuring Efficiency of Hydropower Plants in Nepal Using Data Envelopment Analysis  
The subsection below is primarily based on facts and figures found in: Jha and Shrestha (2006)xl   
 
Jha and Shrestha (2006) have used input-oriented DEA on fourteen hydropower plants 
over the years 2001-2004 to evaluate the efficiency of the hydropower plants owned by the 
NEA. DEA sets an efficient frontier using mathematical modeling. It then assesses other NEA 
hydropower plants’ relative efficiency levels by comparing their input-to-output relationship 
with that of the efficiency frontier. The efficiency score ranges from 0 to 1.  
 The DEA under Jha and Shrestha (2006) focuses on minimizing inputs while keeping the 
outputs constant. This assesses the inefficiency of NEA-owned and controlled hydropower 
plants in the electricity generation sectors. The authors have ignored the output maximization 
DEA because they believe outputs are normally fixed. Yet, it is hard to believe this is true. 
Rather, an output-maximization DEA would have been helpful to convince that more capital 
investment in R&D and technological advancements would help increase the NEA’s electricity 
production. From here, we could strongly state that attracting more private funds to the 
hydropower industry will be helpful by way of providing more funding for the capital upgrades 
required to fill up the electricity shortage. PSP is being emphasized as a funding option for the 
reasons previously discussed in the subsection 2.2. An input-oriented DEA focuses on reducing 
the costs of inputs, which, in turn, reduces their opportunity costs arising from unnecessary 
investments in the inputs. However, we are trying to see how Nepal’s excess energy demand 
can be fulfilled, rather than how the NEA’s budget can be reduced.  
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 The main inputs that the authors chose were gross capacity of a power plant measured 
in MW, which they considered to be fixed since it cannot be adjusted in the short run; annual 
expenditure for operation and management (henceforth O&M) inputs measured in Nepalese 
currency – NRs; and the number of employees at hydropower plants, where all the staffs are 
given equal weight. So, this tends to overestimate the outputs compared to inputs. The outputs 
include the annual energy generated measured in GWh, the maximum power output by those 
plants during the winter system peak and during the summer system peak, both measured in 
MW. Here, all the three inputs have different measurement of units, which makes it impossible 
to compare them with the outputs measured in two different units again. The authors have 
missed out on explaining how they carried out an input-to-output ratio analysis with those 
varying units of consideration.  
 The overall average efficiency of all the NEA hydropower plants considered is 50%, 
their mean technical efficiency is 74% and their scale efficiency is 71%.xli We should be 
aware of the huge loss to the Nepalese economy, when this efficiency score is applied to 
the 58.76% of the total electricity provided just by the NEA hydropower plants. NEA can 
increase its technical efficiency up to 100% without sacrificing its output level, by reducing 
its input investments by 26%. Scale inefficiency surfaces from either because of surpassing 
the optimal output level or due to the lack of output production and its ability to gain the 
full advantage because it is far less than the optimal production level. In either case, more 
efficient production methods would help increase those plants’ scale efficiencies.  
This article, through the data collected, has been able to show that NEA-owned and run 
hydropower plants tend to be more inefficient. However, trying to eliminate the over-
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staffing problem and increasing efficiency of the plants could save the national grid much 
more capital that it could invest in more plants which would then increase electricity supply 
in general.  
 
3.2 Private Micro-Hydropower and Associated Investments in Nepal: The Barpak Village Case            
and Broader Issues 
The subsection below is primarily based on facts and figures found in: Ghale, Shrestha and 
deLucia (2000) xlii 
 
 Ghale, Shrestha and deLucia (2000) present a case for PSP in Nepal’s rural areas. They 
have supported their ideas using the results from a private MHP in a rural village of Nepal – 
namely Barpak village. They portray both direct and indirect benefits, along with direct costs of 
a basic MHP in a rural area. The private investor of the Barpak electrification happens to be one 
of the authors of this article – Bir Bahadur (henceforth, Bahadur).  
 The authors portray the picture of rural areas like Barpak, and how these areas often 
lack very basic infrastructure, including transportation and communication. Only a small 
percentage of the population residing in the country’s rural areas has access to electricity 
supply either from the national grid or self-generation. However, a lot of villages still do not 
have access to electricity mainly because the NEA’s transmission lines do not reach those areas. 
Barpak is one of such villages. Electricity in Barpak was introduced for the first time through 
Bahadur’s initiative of micro-hydropower that started delivering electricity from August 1991 
onwards.   
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 This private initiative was already delivered in 1991, whereas all the policies and other 
articles we have considered for this thesis state that privatization of energy sector began only 
from the year 1992. This article states that de-licensing of all micro-hydropower schemes and 
related sales took place in 1984. In addition to this, the Nepalese government started providing 
micro-hydropower credits and partial subsidies for electrification equipment from 1985. 
Although the energy sector privatization began before 1992, it was only limited to MHPs. So, 
this article agrees that benefits of the 1992 legislation has led to the privatization of a lot of 
formerly NEA-managed mini and small-hydropower based in isolated grids. This was mainly 
because it was getting very expensive for the national electricity grid to spend its scarce 
resources in RE because they had to provide electricity to most of those rural areas at almost 
half of the average retail tariff.xliii They could not afford to continue this any longer, especially 
since even the urban areas were starting to face heavy load shedding schedules. Another 
reason for the privatization of NEA’s grids in those rural areas was because private schemes are 
profit-oriented. So, the private MHPs tend to be more cost-efficient, profit-driven which leads 
to investment in technological advancements, leading to an overall improved efficiency. The 
importance of PSP has increased even more since the NEA has withdrawn from RE. 
 This article shows the evolution of micro-hydropower schemes. People in Nepal’s rural 
areas have been using horizontal water wheels called ‘ghattas’ for centuries, which is a 
technology that originated from Tibet. It has been estimated that currently there exist 25,000 
to 30,000 ghattas only in a lot of hilly and mountainous regions of the country. However, a 
ghatta’s generating capacity is only 1 horse power, which is equivalent to only 746 Watts. This 
amount of electricity is barely enough to drive grinding equipment for grain, which is one of 
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their main sources of food consumption and revenue. So, they cannot afford to spend this 
electricity for their daily lighting purposes. There have been efforts to improve those privately 
owned ghattas, however, this is also not enough for electricity consumption. Therefore, efforts 
like advanced micro-hydropower was seen to be important. This gave rise to the Barpak 
electrification project.  
 Barpak village electrification is an example of a private micro-hydropower scheme. It is 
an isolated grid; meaning, it does not sell the electricity produced from its plant to the NEA. As 
stated by the article, this project has turned out to be profitable for Bahadur. Retained profits 
have been mobilized towards making the already existing hydropower more cost-efficient and 
productive. The project along with providing electricity sales revenue to the private 
entrepreneur, has also led to additional economic development in Barpak. It has been found 
that the project has transformed the village by generating and distributing electricity – direct 
benefits, as well as by providing new entrepreneurial and employment opportunities for the 
village residents that have been possible through the electricity provided by this project – 
indirect benefits.  
 Although this paper has given a proper picture of the prospects and benefits of PSP in 
rural areas, especially with micro-hydropower, the authors have missed out on some analysis. It 
has been mentioned that during the initial year of operation, the plant capacity exceeded 
domestic demand by a huge margin. This underutilization of the plant’s capacity should have 
relatively increased the fixed costs. But this figure of loss has not been mentioned. Also, the 
additional variable costs including the costs of construction materials, helicopter means 
required to transport materials and equipment from the capital city Kathmandu to Barpak, and 
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the costs of labor during necessary during the construction phase have not been measured. 
This article also does not mention the direct costs for the fifty reinforced concrete poles that 
were constructed after a few years of the plant’s operation, to replace the wooden ones in 
order to ensure low maintenance costs and reliable power supply to the village. These factors 
hinder us from getting the true measure of direct costs. 
 Other than just the costs, the authors ignore the measure of what percentage of the 
village households now have access to electricity after the Barpak electrification started 
operating since August 1991. This would help us get a picture of how efficient and useful micro-
hydropower projects really are in cases of RE. This could also be used to measure the total 
electricity revenue received from some wealthy households in the village who use extra 
amounts of electricity and in return pay per unit (kWh) consumption instead of a flat rate as 
paid by the rest of the villagers. This paper has ignored the measurement of this extra 
electricity used. All those factors give misleading scenarios of direct and indirect costs and 
benefits to the private investor. Considering the fact that it took only fifteen months for the 
plant to be constructed and operated, we can say that MHPs in general are reliable to solve the 
urgent energy crisis in the rural areas. This paper does not mention about this time-saving 
indirect benefit either.   
 It should be noticed that there are no traces of indirect costs mentioned in this article. 
This may be the case because one of the authors happens to be the private investor in Barpak’s 
case. This makes it seem as though this paper may be biased towards showing only the positive 
consequences of the project and ignoring the indirect costs. This deprives us from getting more 
accurate results for the purpose of our empirical analyses in chapter 4.  
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 Furthermore, this article shows how even small investments in the rural areas can lead 
to massive electricity and other economic benefits. The primary objective of the private 
entrepreneurs investing in hydropower is to earn profit through electricity sales revenue. 
However, other village residents can utilize such electricity provision in establishing small 
businesses. Although such RE requires only a small percentage of what would otherwise be 
required for a larger hydropower project, there is lack of PSP in Nepal’s case of rural 
electrification. This is because of the lack of electricity demand which limits the revenue that 
can be collected through electricity tariffs paid by the consumers in such regions. This is one of 
the reasons why the government of Nepal has been trying to provide incentives to private 
sectors investing in smaller hydropower projects that seem to be suitable for smaller scale of 
electricity demands. Although privatization efforts in the micro-hydropower have been visible 
since past few decades, there is still much that can be and should be done. One of the reasons 
for the lack of PSP in RE is because those areas lack knowledgeable and experienced individuals 
and organizations like NGOs and INGOs that are essential for the initiation and operation of 
those projects.               
 Apart from the costs and benefits measures of the Barpak electrification, the authors 
have provided suggestions on how to improve not just RE, but the entire national energy sector 
through improved financial and technical assistances. After the Barpak example, five new MHPs 
have been delivered in the region with five more in the process of being developed. This shows 
that along with the benefits that the village residents received from electricity access, the 
Barpak electrification was profitable to the private investor as well. PSP does not mean that the 
project excludes other institutional assistances. Barpak micro-hydropower became a success as 
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a result of joint financial and technological support from INGOs like ADBN and Intermediate 
Technology Development Group (henceforth, ITDG), other private sources such as KMI 
(Kathmandu Metal Industries) and Development Consulting Services (henceforth, DCS) and 
government credit programs and subsidies. So, assistance from all those sectors is vital, 
especially since the private investors who can easily afford capital investment for MHPs and 
SHPs often try to fetch larger profit margins, and thus may prefer not getting involved in RE; 
whereas, small scale private investors in the rural areas usually are the ones who need financial 
aid. Thus, those institutions should support PSP in the RE through financial and technical 
support, market assessment and development, and information dissemination.  
 
 
3.3 Does Infrastructure Reform Work for the Poor? A Case Study From Guatemala  
The subsection below is primarily based on facts and figures found in: Foster and Araujo (2004) 
xliv 
 Foster and Araujo (2004) have presented a case study on economic and social results of 
electricity privatization in Guatemala. According to the WDI, Guatemala is a lower middle 
income country; whereas, Nepal is a low income country. Although they do not fall in the same 
category, their income category level is close, and thus options experimented by Guatemala can 
be expected to be economically viable for Nepal. Nepal’s external debt as a % of Gross National 
Income (henceforth, GNI) is not as high as that of Guatemala. But if the country with higher 
external debt has been able to improve its electricity sector through private investment 
policies, then it is reasonable to assume such policies will help increase funding towards Nepal’s 
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electricity supply as well since the NEA is already in high debt. As is the case with Nepal, the 
mismatch of increasing demand of electricity with the stagnant electricity supply due to limited 
funding for new investments led Guatemala to implement the electricity reform.xlv  
 Before Guatemala’s energy sector reform in 1996, the electricity used to be provided by 
two state-owned companies: Empresa Eléctrica de Guatemala (henceforth, EEGSA) and 
Instituto Nacional de Electrificación (henceforth, INDE). The country’s Electricity Law of 1996 
opened up opportunities for PSP in electricity market. The main objectives behind this 
privatization policy were to increase investment and to improve efficiency through competition, 
as are the objectives of Nepal’s electricity privatization policies that were brought into effect 
starting from 1992.  
 This infrastructural reform divided the electricity generation responsibility between the 
INDE and private investors equally at a 50-50% proportion. However, the transmission is still 
operated by INDE alone. To me, this approach actually seems to enhance the process of 
attracting PSP because the private entrepreneurs do not have to invest huge sums of money 
into constructing transmission lines by themselves; they can rather use the ones provided by 
the government electricity unit. Out of the electricity generation, transmission and distribution, 
the distribution sector has been completely privatized, and is now under the control of three 
private companies, namely: EEGSA - previously government unit, Distribuidora de Energía de 
Oriente Sociedad Anónima (henceforth, DEORSA) and Distribuidora de Electricidad de 
Occidente, Sociedad Anónima (henceforth, DEOCSA). Here, we can see that the concentration 
ratio of the private firms involved is very high. This shows that the market reforms do not 
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guarantee competition. In addition to this already existing high concentration ratio, the 
Guatemalan government added to those three distribution firms’ monopolistic control by 
allowing them to set their own electricity prices. As a result of such reforms, electricity tariffs 
rose between 60% and 80%. However, the government introduced a social tariff to keep the 
charges at pre-reform levels. 
 As a result of electricity privatization, the Guatemalan households experienced a rise in 
electricity coverage from 53% in 1996 to 70% 1999. Considering the pre-privatization phase 
from 1993 to 1996, and the post-privatization phase from 1996 to 1999, we notice that 
electricity privatization turned out to have a massive scale of direct benefits to the residents 
there. There was a noticeable rise in the number of new electricity connections at different 
levels after electricity privatization: 58%, 13% and 94% increments at national, urban and rural 
levels respectively. Similarly, the reform increased the probability of so far underserved 
households receiving electricity connections; in this case, a rise of 89%, 84% and 123% was 
noticed at national, urban and rural levels respectively. Since the 1996 electricity reform, 
financial resources including privatization revenue channeled towards RE in Guatemala has 
nearly tripled.  
 We can notice that there is one major difference between the electricity privatization 
approaches taken by Guatemala and Nepal. Whereas Guatemala has privatized its entire 
electricity sector, including distribution networks, the NEA still is a vertical monopoly. The IPPs 
in Nepal, except for the isolated grids and the ones investing in hydropower projects lesser than 
1 MW, are required to have PPAs to be able to sell electricity only through NEA. Although there 
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are policies that allow private entrepreneurs to lease in government-owned electric substations 
to distribute electricity, this is a minor effort compared to the complete privatization of 
distribution networks. This might be one of the major reasons why Nepal has not been able to 
see significant positive changes in terms of electricity supply like Guatemala.  
 This article shows a more balanced picture of Guatemala’s experience of electricity 
privatization. On the one hand, it shows that the reform has led to huge increments in the 
nation’s electrification. On the other hand, this article shows that the control of electricity price 
hikes and pilferage problems are doubtful. Overall, it shows that electricity privatization 
increases electricity supply which is the main concern for Nepal to reduce its electricity 
shortages. The impacts of electricity privatization in Guatemala sound very encouraging for 
electricity-deficient country like Nepal to take lessons from.  
 Although it gives strong statistical records for direct costs and benefits to the 
Guatemalans, this article misses out on providing the facts and figures for the costs and 
benefits that the private entrepreneurs face. This article gives us a picture to assess the pros 
and cons of electricity reforms to the consumers, but tells us nothing regarding how Guatemala 
managed to attract private investors in the electricity sector. Foster and Araujo (2004) also have 
not provided information on indirect costs and benefits of electricity privatization that the 
private firms and the Guatemalans face. This article is supposed to present a case study, which 
in my opinion should give a full and clear picture of both direct and indirect costs and benefits 
to the actively involved private entrepreneurs as well as Guatemala’s population.   
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3.4 Global Electric Power Reform Privatization and Liberalization of the Electric Power 
Industry in Developing Countries 
The subsection below is primarily based on facts and figures found in: Bacon and Jones (2001) 
xlvi  
 Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) mention four main reasons for electricity privatization. 
One of them is poor performance of the state-owned and run electricity sectors in terms of high 
costs, lack of electricity supply in some areas and unreliable power supply in the areas that do 
have electricity access. The other reason is the national grid’s financial inability to invest into 
advanced technologies in order to improve efficiency that would help increase energy supply, 
or even just to maintain the already existing ones. Another driving force for energy privatization 
is the need to mobilize the national financial resources so far devoted to energy sector, into 
other investments. The last reason is to raise government revenue from the sale of its assets, 
such as substations and machinery. This article reflects a larger group of economies that have 
undergone electricity privations. Thus, a lot of conditions and cases mentioned by the authors 
do not directly apply to Nepal’s energy situation. For example, only the first two driving forces 
explain the need of increased PSP in the country.  
 For majority of the developing countries, before the privatization of their energy 
sectors, the public grids were left without any incentive to earn higher profits because there 
was no drive to compete against other players in the market. So, energy sectors were found to 
be undergoing excessive costs, as in the NEA’s overstaffing case. The service quality 
deteriorated and there was no motivation to increase supply. From the other literature reviews 
and research, those reasons and conditions seem to reflect Nepal’s national grid’s situation. 
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 The authors present four models as a path towards full-reform: model 1 reflects 
complete monopoly; model 2 is vertical monopoly that gives rise to competition only in the 
generation sector; model 3, where distribution companies purchase electricity from the 
generators they prefer leading to competition in the wholesale market but not the retail one; 
model 4 is the one with competition in the retail market as well. Nepal’s energy sector has 
moved on from model 1 to 2; meaning, there are plenty of rooms for further privatization of 
the sector if allowed. In the process of such reforms, the IPPs should secure long-term PPAs 
with the state-owned utilities to guarantee a flow of revenue. This article ignores RE since IPPs 
in the rural areas are not PPA-secured because of the transmission lines not being available to 
majority of the rural areas.   
 Benefits of electricity privatization can be noticed from the following table, where the 
authors have extracted information on how electricity privatization has brought changes in the 
four South American electricity distribution companies. The data include information from 
different years of privatization until 1998: 
TABLE 3.4.1, source: Bacon and Jones (2001). Page 17. 
Determinant Peru (b) Argentina (c) Argentina Edenor Chile Chilectra 
Year privatized 1994 1992 1992 1987 
Energy sales (GWh/year) +19% +79% +82% +26% 
Energy losses (%) -50% -68% -63% -70% 
No. of employees  -43% -60% -63% -9% 
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 The above data that show the rise in energy sales, reduction in the energy losses and 
the number of employees seem to solve Nepal’s problems of electricity shortages, electricity 
losses through pilferages and overstaffing. So, this is makes a convincing argument for the need 
of PSP in Nepal’s electricity distribution sectors as well; this may help increase efficiencies in 
electricity distribution as well along with its generation, and thus increase electricity supply as 
shown by the above numbers. Especially for developing countries where supply costs > revenue 
as in the NEA’s casexlvii, the authors suggest their distribution sectors to be privatized too. 
According to them, this would help attract more PSP since there are more buyers for the power 
generated through PSP.  
 Also, electricity reforms should be determined by some level of government guidance. 
As with New Zealand’s case, privatization without any form of State governance resulted in 
electricity tariff hikes that ultimately forced the government to put price controls on power 
suppliers. Political instability highly influences the level of reform possibility. Thus, in order to 
attract more PSP, the government should guarantee safeguarding investments and provide 
proper tariff and licensing incentives.  
 The authors give more priority to how benefits can be achieved from privatizing 
distribution sectors rather than generation and transmission ones. This may be ignoring the fact 
that distribution is possible only through increased generation. It is concerned with the 
secondary supply to consumers rather than the primary supply to the distributors themselves.     
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3.5 Synthesis  
 In this section, we will consider the articles used in our literature review from 
subsections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. Authors of all the four articles agree that publicly owned and 
controlled energy sectors tend to limit electricity supply due to management inefficiencies and 
limited financial sources. Among these, some provide concrete evidences through calculations 
and some just refer to examples of other nations’ energy sector privatization experiences. For 
example, unlike other articles, 3.1 offers partial mathematical evidence that the government-
owned and controlled hydropower plants in Nepal are inefficient.   
 Whereas 3.1 mentions NEA’s inefficiency in operating its hydropower plants as the 
major cause for the existing electricity shortages in Nepal, the rest of the articles provide PSP in 
the energy sector as a solution to increase electricity supply in Nepal. Whereas 3.1 and 3.2 limit 
their views to PSP in Nepal’s energy sector, the other two articles extrapolate results from 
other countries’ electricity privatization experiences. 3.3 and 3.4 portray the difficulties in the 
path of PSP, along with showing that the consequences of PSP may not always result as 
expected. For example, Guatemala- a country comparable to Nepal roughly in terms of income 
category according to the WDI, had experienced unprecedented increases in electricity demand 
accompanied by the inefficient energy supply arising from the public sector. Thus Guatemala 
privatized its entire energy sector expecting to increase electricity supply through competition. 
It was successful in increasing electricity supply, but at the cost of price hikes. A lesson we can 
learn from their experience is that PSP does not necessarily lead to greater competition. Also 
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the last two articles make strong cases for privatization of electricity distribution sectors as 
well.  
 The cases under 3.1 and 3.2 provide a biased picture to make arguments “for” electricity 
privatization. Whereas, the case under 3.1 shows the inefficiency of the NEA’s hydropower 
plants, it does not mention how it compares to the efficiency level of the ones that are privately 
owned and controlled. The case under 3.2 mentions benefits, however it does not disclose any 
kind of indirect costs. Although, it is assumed that MHPs have very minimal economic and 
environmental costs, it is hard to believe they are free of indirect costs. The last two articles 
portray an unbiased picture of privatization by addressing both the benefits and costs based on 
the experiences of the countries that have undergone electricity privatization to some extent or 
another. Overall, the authors of all the articles found and used in this thesis support the 
research hypothesis by directly or indirectly proposing increased PSP to be the solution to 
Nepal’s energy crisis. 
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Case Study on a Private Micro-hydropower Project in Barpak village, Nepal – Rural 
Electrification 
The subsection below is primarily based on facts and figures found in: Ghale, Shrestha and 
deLucia (2000) xlviii 
 
 This is a brief cost-benefit study of one of the private MHPs that was established in 
Barpak village as mentioned in the subsection 3.2. The Barpak village is located in the Gorkha 
district of Nepal, from where it takes close to two days walking to get to the nearest road. The 
village did not have access to electricity until it was introduced in 1991 through this MHP 
initiative by Bahadur. Barpak is a relatively large village according to the Nepalese standards. If 
this comparatively higher standard village lacked electricity access even until the early 1990’s, 
we can imagine the conditions of other lower standard villages to be even worse. The fact that 
82.28% of Nepal’s population still resides in such rural conditions alarms the need for RE. 
   The construction of this project started in April of 1990 and ended in June of 1991. 
Operations began since August 1991. This plant began with an installed capacity of 50 KW. To 
start the project, Bahadur had obtained a loan worth 1.15 million Nepali Rupees (henceforth, 
NRs) from the Asian Development Bank, Nepal (henceforth, ADBN). Additionally, Bahadur 
received a grant worth NRs. 0.49 million from Nepal’s electrification subsidy program. The total 
cost of the project was estimated at NRs. 1.9 million, and the terms for the loan were 
determined at an annual interest rate of 15% and a repayment period of 7 years. The loan 
contract stipulated that the interest rates were subject to change as per ADBN’s judgment, 
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charged by the ADBN at the end of the construction, and the principal was to be paid back once 
the project would start generating electricity sales revenue. At the time of construction, the 
interest rate increased to 19%, and later it lowered to 17%. So, we will consider 17%, since the 
interest and capital payments were to begin after the completion of the plant construction. We 
will now use CBA to analyze if Bahadur’s investment on Barpak village electrification really was 
profitable or not. Following are a set of assumptions and figures we know of in relation to direct 
costs and benefits associated with the Barpak project: 
 Present Values (Discounted Values) of direct costs incurred for the Barpak Village 
Electrification Case:  
1. PV of the loan obtained from ADBN:  
Time period = 7 years; interest rate = 17%; monthly loan installments = NRs. 18,000  
yearly loan repayments = NRs. 216,000. Interest rate as demanded by the ADBN has 
already been incorporated in the loan installment payments that the private investor 
makes each year; therefore, here we consider the discount rate to be the investor’s 
opportunity cost for borrowing from ADBN instead of some other banks. Other banks’ 
lending interest rate in 1990, according to the WDI, was 14.42%. Since the investor 
makes the same payment over the 7 years, it is an annuity. For annuity, we need to 
consider the PV of annuity of $1 factor, which can be calculated using the  
formula: [1-1/(1+r)^n]/r. 
 So, at interest rate of 14.42%, i.e., r = 0.1442, PV of annuity of $1 factor  
= [1-1/(1+0.1442)^7]/0.1442 
= 4.234 (corrected to 3 decimal places)  
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Therefore,  
PV of loan  
= payment * PV of annuity of $1 factor 
= 216,000 * 4.234 
= negative NRs. 914,544 since this is a cash outflow 
 
2. PV of the land sold: negative NRs. 840,000. Since this cost took place at the time of 
construction, it is not a future cash outflow. Therefore, we do not need to discount the 
value.  
3. PV of plant fixation cost (incurred once): The plant was damaged by lighting, and 
therefore had to be fixed for the cost of NRs. 400,000. The article does not mention 
when it was repaired. However, it does mention that the plant had to be repaired after 
it started operating, which was 1991, and was fixed by 1994. Therefore, time period to 
consider = 3 years (1994-1991); discount rate once again is the deposit interest rate 
because had the investor not have to spend on the repair, he would have deposited it in 
a bank and earned an interest rate of 11.92%.  
Therefore, PV of plant fixation cost= 400,000/(1+0.1192)^3 = NRs. 285,323.07.  
 
4. PV of the operating labor cost: Here, the time period that needs to be considered is 
infinity, and the salary to be regarded is the same because the article has not mentioned 
for how long the investor will have to pay the same amount of salary to the employees 
who are managing the plant. Discount rate = deposit interest rate = 11.92%.  
44 
 
Therefore, PV of operating labor cost = 48,000/0.1192 = NRs. 402,684.56.  
 
 Present Values (Discounted Values) of direct benefits incurred for the Barpak Village 
Electrification Case:  
1. PV of the operating benefit from the electricity sales revenue: Here time period to be 
considered is infinity, and the amount of revenue is regarded to be constant every year 
because the article has not mentioned about how long the same revenue will keep 
flowing in. The interest rate = deposit interest rate in order to have consistency with 
most of the PV of costs calculated above. We will discount the revenue to their net 
present value like we discount perpetual bonds due to their continuous nature.   
Therefore, the PV of the electricity sales revenue = 276,000/0.1192 = NRs. 2,315,436.24. 
 List of all direct costs:  
1. PV of the loan obtained from ADBN = NRs. 914,544 
2. PV of the land sold = NRs. 840,000 
3. PV of plant fixation cost = NRs. 285,323.07 
4. PV of the operating labor cost = NRs. 402,684.56 
Total PV of direct costs = NRs. (914,544 + 840,000 + 285,323.07 + 402,684.56) = NRs. 
2,442,551.63  
 List of all direct benefits:  
1. PV of the operating benefit from the electricity sales revenue = NRs. 2,315,436.24 
Total PV of direct benefits = NRs. 2,315,436.24 
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Therefore, according to the above information regarding direct costs and benefits, the 
discounted net direct benefits would be as follows:  
 Discounted Net Direct Benefits = PV of all the direct benefits – PV of all the direct costs = 
NRs. (2,315,436.24 – 2,442,551.63) = - NRs. 127,115.39.  
 
This project is not profitable since the discounted net present benefit is negative. Also, due 
to the negative operating cash flows for the initial 7 years (loan repayment + operating 
costs exceed the operating revenue), this project’s payback period is in tens of years.xlix  
 
Limitations concerning the above cost-benefit analysis: 
 The results from our CBA conflict with the conclusion provided by the authors of the 
article on the Barpak project. The authors state that this private MHP had been running 
profitably. However, we need to consider that this article does not give enough information to 
calculate capital depreciation, the cost of plant improvement that took place after the plant 
fixation and revenue collected from wealthier households who paid per unit KWh for electricity 
rather than the cheap flat monthly rate as paid by the rest of the households.  
 Whereas there are no traces of indirect costs, the authors do mention limited indirect 
benefits of the project. The Barpak village is known for its educational facilities that range from 
primary to secondary schooling. The fulfilling of electricity demands in the village’s households 
has also provided lighting for after-dark hours studying. Before the delivery of the private 
micro-hydropower in August 1991, the main source of income residing in Barpak used to be 
from army services, animal husbandry and agriculture. After 1991, the electricity availability 
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gave rise to other forms of economic activities. Four specific sectors included a grain mill driven 
by electric motor, a furniture workshop using power tools, a bakery using an electric oven, and 
a business making traditional Nepali paper utilizing an electric boiler and an electric beater. All 
those additional economic activities increased the variety of employment opportunities for the 
village residents. Since the benefits have only been mentioned, but lack numbers and figures, 
there is no basis to calculate the figure for indirect benefits either. 
 It might be the case that the missing information on benefits outweighs the missing 
costs. This means that the CBA results may have a profit picture for this project as mentioned 
by the article. I assume this is the case because I believe that no private entrepreneur would 
want to invest in a project that is already known to be running a loss as shown by the above 
CBA.  
 
4.2 A Case Study on the Khimti Hydropower Project 
 The Khimti Hydropower Project (henceforth, KHP) is Nepal’s first private hydropower 
project operated under the BOOT technique. It is located 100km east of Kathmandu – the 
capital city. It is located between two rural districts of Nepal - Ramechhap and Dolakha. For 
Dolakha, the average population as of 1991 was 79.1 persons /sq. km, and the closest urban 
centre was Kathmandu – which is 132km away. Agriculture is the major source of income and it 
provides employment to 63.83% of the actively employed population.l For Ramechhap, as of 
2008, this district’s population was 211824li; meaning 0.74% of Nepal’s total population which 
was at that time 28.8 million inhabitants, according to the WDI. From this total population, only 
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55% are considered economically active, a majority of which heavily relies upon agricultural 
production for a living.lii Both the districts severely lack transportation facilities.  
 So, KHP is an example of rural electrification on a larger scale that has not only extended 
its direct and indirect benefits to the rural areas nearby, but has also added 350 GWh of annual 
electricity supply to the national grid. liii Its installed capacity of 60MW is supported by the 
Khimti river. The power station construction began in June 1996 and ended in July 2000. Its 
capital cost of $140 million was financed by Nepal’s Butwal Power Company Limited 
(henceforth, BPC) and Norway’s Statkraft. liv Himal Power Limited (henceforth, HPL) was 
established in 1992 to promote the KHP project using BOOT method that had a license from the 
Nepalese government for fifty years.lv 
 As any other plant construction phase, KHP construction also required power supply. 
However, there was no electricity grid in the project area, because of which the construction of 
a SHP of 500KW took place, namely Jhankre Rural Electrification and Development Project 
(henceforth, JREDP). Before the KHP construction started, none of the Village Development 
Committees (henceforth, VDCs) in the project area had access to electricity.lvi Most households 
used home-made kerosene lamps to meet their lighting needs. However, the establishment of 
the JREDP, led by KHP, provided electrification in the area. The first three years of JREDP’s 
operation had fulfilled lighting needs of 300 households, and had helped establish seven small-
scale electricity based enterprises.lvii Extending from the outcomes delivered by this SHP, we 
can expect that hydropower plants with larger capacity would be able to provide electricity to 
thousands of Nepalese households and industries.  
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 KHP’s PPA with the NEA is valid for twenty years, although the BOOT license has been 
granted for fifty years.  After the PPA period, NEA gets 50% ownership over the project, 
whereas after the fifty years’ license expiration, the entire project will be transferred to the 
government. The PPA period may be renewed, but nothing has been found that directs to 
whom and at what rates will the electricity be sold at after this period expires.  
 KHP has been considered to be one of the most environmentally friendly projects till 
date. Along with introducing electricity to a lot of villages in those districts, it had other indirect 
benefits too, primary reason being, to maintain good relationships with the residents there in 
order to avoid any delays during the construction phase, and to avoid any damages during its 
operation phase. During the construction phase, the total number of village work force reached 
to 4,000. One of the major indirect benefits included the establishment of Khimti Community 
and Environment Unit (KECU) that was responsible to improve education, health and sanitation, 
and vocational training for women’s self-employment. This unit also focused on forest 
conservation; 84,000 seedlings were planted in places affected by deforestation and 
agricultural techniques were improved through technical advancement trainings to about 4,600 
farmers.lviii 
 One of the important lessons to learn from KHP is that maintaining good public relations 
with the local communities may help minimize unnecessary delays in production due to strikes, 
or local people’s dissatisfaction due to private investors’ interference in their communities. 
Avoiding such delays help to keep the projects’ costs low. Moreover, the total expense of KECU 
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was less than 1% of the total project cost. lix Thus, why not take up the small cost in return for 
greater benefits?  
 Due to lack of data availability, it is not possible to conduct a CBA for KHP. However, a 
few direct and indirect costs and benefits for this project are mentioned in the exhibit A.IX in 
the appendix. Overall, this project portrays the direct and indirect benefits that a medium-scale 
hydropower in rural areas can have. Although the annual production of 350GWh energy is 
transmitted to the NEA, SHPs that may be constructed to facilitate larger hydropower projects: 
JREDP in KHP’s case can be used to electrify the villages that have never had electricity before. 
Thus, RE could be a part of larger projects. It is to be noticed that a huge portion of capital 
investment was contributed by foreign private investors as displayed in the exhibit A.IX in the 
appendix. Thus, PSP from foreign sectors should be attracted towards Nepal’s energy sector 
because the domestic private investors alone cannot afford huge hydropower projects.   
 
 
4.3 Financial and Economic Analysis of Micro-Hydro Power in Nepal 
 More than just introducing electricity into the rural areas of Nepal, the goal should be to 
sustain and attract further investments, which is possible through earned profits. Here, we 
continue to defend the case “for” privatization compared to other sources of funding. 
Extending the results of comparison between private and communal investments as well, we 
will see that privately- owned and controlled MHP tends to be more beneficial to the investors 
than the community-owned and controlled MHPs. This is mainly because private investments 
allow the investors appropriate all the profits for themselves and be held responsible for the 
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risks of any losses. The net present values for Angakhola MHP, Daunekhola MHP and 
Tikhedhunga MHP were +$703, -($20,884) and –($60,706) respectively.lx These figures show the 
private investment to be profitable and the rest to be at loss. Although all the projects are 
economically desirable to improve living standards of the rural residents, only Angakhola MH is 
financially viable. Considering the fact that even without grant and lesser subsidy compared the 
last two projectslxi, the private investment is profitable. Thus, increased subsidies and grants to 
PSP would help increase electricity supply in Nepal’s rural areas.  
 
 
CHAPTER 5: LIMITATIONS  
 This thesis has a few limitations in itself. No DEA on private hydropower projects could 
be found and thus, we could not really compare the performances of hydropower plants owned 
and controlled by the government vs. the ones owned and operated by private investors. Had 
we seen positive results from DEA on the privately owned and run hydropower plants, the case 
“for” more PSP in Nepal’s energy sector would be even stronger. Moreover, the DEA used is 
input-oriented which only points out the production side inefficiencies such as overstaffing, or 
lack of incentives among management staff. This supports privatization for the generation 
sector. However, in order to argue for extension of PSP towards the distribution sectors as well, 
and to learn lessons from Guatemala’s electricity privatization that led to an increase in its 
electricity supply, we need to see how inefficient the NEA plants are based on an output-
oriented DEA as well. An output-oriented DEA that would highlight NEA’s distribution 
51 
 
inefficiencies along with its inability to control electricity pilferages due to NEA’s carelessness 
would help make a case for introduction of PSP in the distribution sectors too. However, 
attention needs to be given that electricity privatization does not necessarily eliminate 
problems of electricity tariff hikes and continued electricity pilferages as observed from 
Guatemala’s case.  
 The case study on the Barpak village electrification does not portray all the costs and 
benefits which restricts its CBA from giving a true picture of whether the project was profitable 
or not. CBA for KHP could not be calculated due to lack of availability of data. If we had the 
results for KHP’s profitability, it would have helped to set this project as an example to 
encourage more PSP into medium-scale hydropower projects, along with considering RE as a 
part of such projects.  
 This thesis lacks information on Nepal’s national budget allocation for its energy sector. 
All we know is that the NEA has readily agreed for the need to increase domestic and foreign 
PSP in the rural and urban electricity generation sector mainly due to its financial constraints. 
Had we known this missing piece of information, the extent of the energy sector failure would 
be clearer. This would also show the national budget’s opportunity cost of investing in the 
unpromising energy sector. If this failure and thus opportunity cost is severe, then the need for 
extension of PSP in Nepal’s electricity sector would be more persuasive. 
  It was difficult to choose the most reliable source. In any case of confusion, we have 
dealt with information published by the Nepali authorities and journal articles over the ones 
provided by multilateral organizations and other online websites.   
52 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Out of the continuous growth of electricity demand in Nepal, the major segment 
comprises of domestic consumers. The current domestic electricity consumption consists of 
95.48% of the total energy demand.lxii However, the domestic sector contributes to only 42.52% 
of total electricity sales, whereas the industrial sector that makes up only 1.71% of the total 
energy demand contributes to 37.37% of such electricity sales.lxiii This shows that Nepal’s 
domestic category is deprived of electricity compared to its industrial categories. This, in a way, 
denotes that areas with industrial development, which happen to be at or near the major urban 
cities of Nepal, have more electricity supply compared to the rural areas. Such concentration of 
electricity supply near the cities can be noticed from the exhibit A.IV in the appendix as well, 
where the biggest red area in the centre is Nepal’s capital city. It is extremely important to note 
that currently 82.28% of Nepal’s total population resides in rural areas. As mentioned before, 
the IEA report 2008 shows that compared to 89.7% of the urban households electrification rate, 
only 34% of the rural households had electricity access. This should have called for more 
attention towards RE since the NEA is a government-owned and controlled utility and still holds 
a vertical monopoly; its goal should be to make public provision – in this case electricity, 
accessible to majority of its population if not to all. Even more tragically, the annual report of 
NEA 2009 mentions that the national grid has given up on RE due to its financial constraints. 
Hence, to make electricity accessible to the majority of the population, PSP is a necessity rather 
than an option in the case of RE since the government is not planning to be directly involved 
anymore, except through subsidies, grants and policy amendments favorable to attract private 
investments towards the country’s rural areas.  
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 Including the metropolitan areas, a lot of the MHPs are also situated in the Terai regions 
of the country. Terai is the most popular region for agricultural production in the entire 
country. Private investors’ main goal is to earn profits, either directly through electricity sales 
revenue, or indirectly through using the plants’ forced water to run agro-processing units in 
order to increase efficiency. Out of three major horizontal divisions of the country, Terai is the 
lowest region. This region also has various small scale industries resulting from agro-businesses 
that consume electricity to run those firms and machinery to increase efficiency. Hence, the 
markets that demand more electricity tend to attract private investors. This can be seen from 
the exhibit A.IV in the appendix. 
 As of 2008, a total of 2,496 micro-hydro systems had been installed in forty districts 
generating a total of 17.03 MW.lxiv However, this figure is negligible if compared to Nepal’s total 
hydropower capacity. If RE is assisted by government subsidies to make it look profitable, then 
new entrants can be attracted relatively more easily. The Nepalese government allows 
monopoly to the IPPs interested in RE by allowing only a single IPP to operate in a particular 
rural region as mentioned in the subsection 2.3. In addition to such monopolistic power, these 
IPPs are allowed to fix their own electricity tariffs. PSP in Barpak village electrification can be 
taken as an example, to attract more private investors into MHPs. 
 Run of the river type of projects already dominate Nepal’s hydropower industry.lxv This 
is reasonable because of Nepal’s hilly terrain and abundance of southwards flowing rivers as 
mentioned in the subsection 2.1. As researched, most if not all private hydropower projects so 
far connected to the national grid are run of the river type of hydropower projects. Along with 
the slow growth of PSP in Nepal’s energy sector, the dominance of the run of the river type of 
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hydropower systems partly explains the reason the nation has declared periods of national 
energy crises even after partially privatizing its energy sector. Out of the country’s total 
installed capacity of 564,915 KW, only 0.017% is contributed by storage type of hydropower 
plants, the rest is covered by run of the river schemes.lxvi In order to reduce the seasonal 
electricity shortages that are more severe, PSP needs to be attracted towards pumped storage 
types of hydropower systems. This requires construction of dams unlike the case of run of the 
river hydropower projects; this calls for foreign private investments since the domestic is not 
enough for huge investments. Private investors might not be very keen in such huge capital 
costs since they are required to transfer the entire project to the Nepalese government without 
receiving any compensation at the end of the license period; instead, they have to buy back the 
plants they established if they would like to continue with the same project.lxvii Thus, the 
government may want to market its extendable license policies. However, in most of the rural 
areas, dam construction may not be a good idea not only because of high capital costs, but also 
because of their rugged infrastructure that may be prone to floods and landslides during the 
construction phase. Thus, MHPs still remain to be a better option for RE, and pumped storage 
projects to fulfill urban electricity demands. 
 Encouraging more PSP does not mean limiting other options such as any other forms of 
support from foreign nations and multilateral organizations. However, as discussed in the 
subsection 2.2, both the neighboring economies of Nepal - China and India have already 
privatized their energy sectors. India has completely privatized its electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution sectors. Although China has not explored fast privatization, it has 
the world’s largest electricity generating dam with 32 generators totaling its installed capacity 
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to 22.5 GW.lxviii Hence, Nepal’s political and thus economic instability may not attract China’s 
capital inflow. As far as India is concerned, capital inflow would have to come from private 
sectors since the energy sector has been privatized. Options of grants and loans from 
multilateral organizations are too expensive not just because of their high interest rates, but 
also due to various strings attached to their financial aid package.  
 There was a rise in PSP only during the first few years after the implementation of 
electricity privatization policies, after which it slowed down.lxix We can see this slow progress 
even in the past decade from table A.V in the appendix. The reason for this trend has not been 
explored; however, what we know is the progress in PSP needs to be boosted if we are to 
introduce electricity to rural areas and to reduce the routine load shedding hours in the urban 
areas that already have access to electricity. An investor-friendly environment could be created 
by reducing political instability, along with more policies favoring PSP in the energy sector. The 
government could reduce the amount of royalty charged on larger hydropower projects too 
until Nepal’s energy sector has a strong long-term energy development base. If not, then a 
portion of such royalties should be allocated towards RE as in Guatemala’s case.  
 For the private hydropower projects that get loans from multilateral agencies, the 
payments to loans are to be made in the US dollars. If such PSPs are isolated from the NEA grid 
as in the cases of most REs such as the Barpak village electrification, then no PPAs are required. 
However, if they are connected to the national grid and thus transmit electricity to NEA, then 
they are required to fix PPAs with the NEA. In such cases, PPAs are pegged against the US$ since 
the loan repayments to various multilateral organizations take place in this currency’s form. 
This means that NRs. devaluation against the US$ causes the nominal payment of the loans and 
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interests on it to rise. Just over the time period of ten years, NRs. devalued against US$ from 
NRs. 20 = US$1 to NRs. 75 = US$1.lxx Such Nepalese currency devaluation might make the 
private investors more skeptical on investing in a country where economic stability is a 
question. Thus, once again, the government should be able to safeguard both domestic and 
foreign PSPs in the energy sector.   
 One of the major reasons behind the reduction in electricity is the electricity pilferage 
problem that NEA faces. Electricity is stolen at the distribution phase. Such theft represented a 
significant portion of Nepal’s total energy loss of about 25% in the year 2005.lxxi Thus, the NEA 
should allow privatization of electricity at distribution levels too since private investors tend to 
be more careful about their investment’s profitability. Also, if we are talking about increasing 
electricity supply through competition, then privatization should be extended to distribution 
levels rather than just limiting it to generation phases.  
 The fact that although introducing PSP in Nepal’s energy sector only about two decades 
ago, the IPPs currently contribute 29.56% towards the country’s total electricity supply is 
outstanding. Nepal should learn from its own experimentation of increasing electricity supply 
through the introduction of PSP in its energy sector. Furthermore, lessons should be taken from 
countries like Guatemala and other four South American electricity companies discussed in the 
subsection 3.4; they managed to increase electricity supply through privatization of their 
electricity distribution sectors. As we have seen from above discussions, market reforms do not 
necessarily lead to competition. As a result, electricity prices may rise tremendously as in 
Guatemala’s case. However, since Nepal, at least currently, is not in a bargaining position with 
the IPPs, instead of interfering with limiting the concentration ratio of the firms or with the 
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electricity tariffs, the government should rather provide subsidies to its consumers in order to 
reduce the burden of electricity tariff hikes that may result from privatizing Nepal’s electricity 
distribution sectors. Such subsidies could be extracted from tax revenues and varying amounts 
of royalty collected from IPPs as shown by the tables A.I and A.II in the appendix.  
 It would be nearly impossible to find any developmental strategy without any defects. 
As most of the articles, conjectures and empirical analyses in this thesis suggest, although 
electricity privatization may come with some costs, this measure will help to increase Nepal’s 
electricity supply. Therefore, the hypothesis of this thesis: ‘increased PSP in the electricity 
sector will help Nepal increase its electricity supply’ is true. Thus, PSP in Nepal’s electricity 
sector should be extended further.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A.I 
For domestic electricity sales oriented hydropower projects 
Electricity Capacity Up to 15 years 
 
After 15 years 
Annual capacity 
royalty, per KW 
Energy royalty, 
per KWh 
Annual capacity 
royalty, per KW 
Energy royalty, 
per KWh 
1 MW – 10 MW Rs. 100/- 1.75% Rs. 1,000/- 10% 
10 MW – 100 MW Rs. 150/- 1.85% Rs. 1,200/- 10% 
Above 100 MW Rs. 200/-  2.00% Rs. 1,500/-  10% 
For captive use Rs. 1,500/-  Rs. 3,000/-  
 
Source: "6.13.1 Royalty." The Hydropower Development Policy, 2001. N.p., n.d. Web. 28 Nov. 
2010. <www.doed.gov.np/policy/hydropower_development_policy_2001.pdf>. Page 26 
 
Note: Here, if the excess electricity from captive is sold to the NEA, the energy royalty is 
charged as for the ones above 100 MW.  
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Table A.II 
For export-oriented hydropower projects 
Type Up to 15 years After 15 years 
Annual capacity 
royalty, per KW 
Energy royalty, 
per KWh 
Annual capacity 
royalty, per KW 
Energy royalty, 
per KWh 
Run-of-the-river Rs. 400/- 7.5% Rs. 1,800/- 12% 
Storage Rs. 500/- 10% Rs. 2,000/- 15% 
Source: "6.13.1 Royalty." The Hydropower Development Policy, 2001. N.p., n.d. Web. 28 Nov. 
2010. <www.doed.gov.np/policy/hydropower_development_policy_2001.pdf>. Page 26 
Exhibit A.III – Basic Run of the River Hydropower Mechanism 
 
 Source: Dhungel, Prateek. "Financial Analysis." Financial and Economic Analysis of Micro-Hydro 
Power in Nepal. N/A: Master of Science Paper from The University of Minnesota, 2009. Page 6. 
Print. 
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Exhibit A.IV – Map of Nepal 
 
Source: Dhungel, Prateek. "Financial Analysis." Financial and Economic Analysis of Micro-Hydro 
Power in Nepal. N/A: Master of Science Paper from The University of Minnesota, 2009. Page 39. 
Print. 
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Table A.V 
Particulars 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Peak 
demand 
(MW) 
351.9 391 426 470.33 515.24 557.53 603.28 648.39 721.73 812.50 
Available 
energy 
(GWh) 
1701.45 1868.42 2066.45 2261.13 2380.89 2642.75 2780.92 3051.82 3185.95 3130.77 
Hydro 1233.22 1113.36 1113.13 1478.04 1345.46 1522.9 1568.55 1747.42 1793.14 1839.52 
Thermal 66.73 27.14 17.01 4.4 9.92 13.669 16.1 13.31 9.17 9.06 
Purchase 
(total) 
401.5 727.93 936.31 778.69 1025.519 1106.184 1196.27 1291.09 1383.64 1282.19 
India 232.2 226.54 238.29 149.88 186.675 241.389 266.23 328.83 425.22 356.45 
Nepal 169.3 501.38 698.02 628.81 838.844 864.795 930.04 962.26 958.42 925.74 
∆ in IPP’s 
contribution 
(GWh) 
- +332.08 +196.64 -69.21 +210.03 +25.951 +65.25 +32.22 -3.84 -32.68 
Source: Nepal Electricity Authority, A Year in Review, Fiscal Year 2008/09. Kathmandu: Nepal 
Electricity Authority, 2009. Page 76. Print. 
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Graphs A.VI and A.VII have been constructed by the author of this thesis by extracting statistical 
information provided by the WDI: "World Databank." World Databank. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Nov. 
2010. <http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2>. 
Graph A.VI 
 
Here, we can see that starting from the year of electricity privatization (1996), the 
consumption by Nepal’s households has significantly increased. However, this shows an 
overall picture, and thus does not show the lack of electricity in Nepal’s rural areas. This 
graph supports the thesis hypothesis by showing the rise in electricity consumption by 
the Nepalese households.  
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Graph A.VII 
 
The above shows that PSP in energy sector helps nations increase its total electricity supply. For 
Guatemala, the reform year was 1996, and for Nepal it was 1992. The slopes noticeably start 
becoming steeper starting from those years. Although Guatemala privatized later than Nepal, 
we can see that the electricity production in Guatemala has managed to increase faster than in 
Nepal. This may be due to the difference in electricity privatization levels; Guatemala has 
privatized its generation as well as distribution sectors, whereas Nepal has limited the 
privatization to its generation sector. This also directs towards the need to extend PSP in 
Nepal’s energy sector.  
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Exhibit A.IX (Khimti Hydropower Project) 
Figures for direct costs (all in millions of US$): 
1. Total cost = 140 million [Source: "Description." Nepal: Building Water Infrastructure As 
Part of Khimti I Hydropower Project (KHP-I), Case # 191. N.p., n.d. Web. 28 Nov. 
2010. Page 1. <http://www.jvs-nwp.org.np/publications/Number%20%2023.pdf>. 
 
2. 22-km access road to Khimti I was financed by His Majesty’s Government of Nepal. The 
figure for this cost has not been mentioned. [Source: Honningsvag, B, G. H.  Midttomme, 
K.  Repp, K.  Vaskinn, and T.  Westeren. Hydropower in the new millenium:  proceedings 
of the 4th International Conference on Hydropower Development, Hydropower '01, 
Bergen, Norway, 20-22 June 2001. Lisse, Netherlands: A.A. Balkema, 2001. Page 4. Print] 
 
3. Equity capital of HPL = 34.1 million [Source: Honningsvag, Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn 
and Westeren (2001). Page 5] 
 
4.  Quasi equity (loans from international banks that were convertible to shares) = 9 
million [Source: Honningsvag, Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn and Westeren (2001). Page 5] 
 
5. Statkraft’s capital investment = 25.1 million out of 34.1 million. 2-5 million each were 
contributed by BPC, Alston power, GE Energy and NDF [Source: Honningsvag, 
Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn and Westeren (2001). Page 5] 
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6. ADB + IFC + NORAD + Eksportfinans loans = 92.6 million [Source: Honningsvag, 
Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn and Westeren (2001). Page 5] 
 
7. Quasi-equity from ADB + IFC = 3 million [Source: Honningsvag, Midttomme, Repp, 
Vaskinn and Westeren (2001). Page 5] 
 
8. Overall loan to equity ratio = 70:30 [Source: Honningsvag, Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn 
and Westeren (2001). Page 5] 
 
9. Maintenance grant: Finland had contributed $20 million to construct the 100 km Khimti-
Kathmandu transmission line. [Source: Sharma, Sudhindra, Juhani  Koponen, Annette 
Skovsted Hansen, and Tatsuro Fujikura. Partnershi in Action, Nordic and Japanese Aid 
in Nepal . Stockholm: Paper from The European Institute of Japanese Studies, Stockholm 
School of Economics, Stockholm , 2005. Page 25. Print.] 
 
 
Figures for direct benefits (all in millions of US$): 
10. Annual supply = 350 GWh. This was divided into 104 GWh during the dry period 
(November to April) and 246 GWh during the remaining 6 months. During the dry 
periods, monthly supply sums up to 13-27 GWh = 13,000,000 – 27,000,000 KWh. During 
the wet seasons, monthly supply sums up to 39-42 GWH = 39,000,000 – 42,000,000 
KWh. [Source: Honningsvag, Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn and Westeren (2001). Page 5] 
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11. Normal electricity tariff charged by Khimti = 5.49 cents per KWh = US$0.0549 per KWh 
[Source: Honningsvag, Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn and Westeren (2001). Page 5] 
 
12. During the dry and wet periods, the excess supply is charged at 8.5 cents and 4.2 cents 
respectively. [Source: Honningsvag, Midttomme, Repp, Vaskinn and Westeren (2001). 
Page 5] 
